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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellee concedes that the jurisdictional statement set forth by Appellant
Weinstein is correct. The Supreme Court has deferred jurisdiction to the Court of
Appeals.

Throughout this brief the Appellant is referred to as the "neighbor" or
"Weinstein" and the Appellants are referred to as the "property owners" or the "Popiels,"
consistent with Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
It is difficult to identify the issues Weinstein raises on appeal because they are
confusing.
ISSUE 1(a).

Weinstein urges that the district court erred in declining to grant

his cross motion for summary judgment on the undisputed facts. He then revisits
excerpts of selected facts which he believes to be favorable to him throughout his
Statement of the Case, but fails to marshal the evidence.
Marshaling the evidence entails marshaling or listing all the evidence supporting
the finding that is challenged. See Tingey v. Christensen, 373 Utah Adv. Rep. 10,11
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(Utah 1999); Benvenuto. 372 Utah Adv. Rep. At 4; State v. ex rel T.J.. 945 P.2d 158.
164 (Utah Ct. App. 1997): In re Estate of Hamilton. 869 P.2d 971. 977 (Utah Ct. App.
1994). Weinstein has not done so.
STANDARD:

The standard of review is that a trial court's findings of fact are

reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. See Young v. Young, 979 P.2d 338, 342
(Utah 1999); Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932.937 (Utah 1998); Grossen v.
DeWitU 369 Utah Adv. Rep. 3132 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
The clearly erroneous standard has been applied to what a reasonable person
would have done in specific circumstances. See Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty
WestPev., Inc.. 970 P.2d 1273. 1279 (Utah 1998). The matter under review is a review
of reasonableness. It has been applied to whether a breach of contract is material. See
Coalville City v. Lundgrem 930 P.2d 1206. 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). The matter
under review is a review of contract provisions.
To successfully challenge findings of fact, an appellant must prove they are clearly
erroneous, i.e. against the clear weight of the evidence.
ISSUE 1(b).

Weinstein then urges that the district court improperly interposed

an implied covenant of "good faith and fair dealing" but fails to indicate whether this is
an improper conclusion of law, which requires a different standard of review. One can
only surmise that Weinstein suggests that the trial court misapplied a principle of law
because he uses these words repeatedly.
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STANDARD:

The standard of review is again a clearly erroneous standard.

This Court has consistently held that a determination of the application of "good faith
and fair dealing" is a matter for the trier of fact and is not a conclusion of law.
"Whether there has been a breach of good faith and fair dealing is a factual
issue, generally inappropriate for decision as a matter of law." Cook v.
Zions First Natl Bank 919 P.2d 56. 61 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)
See Mackey v. Cannon, 2000 UT App 36 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). Good faith and
fair dealing are fact sensitive concepts, and whether there has been a breach of good faith
and fair dealing is a factual issue, generally inappropriate as a matter of law. See
Western Farm Credit Bank v. Pratt, 860 P.2d 376, 380 (Utah App. 1993), wherein the
court states such determination is a "factual issue to be determined by [the factfinder]
after consideration of all attendant circumstances and evidence." American Concept Ins.
Co. v. Lochhead, 751 P.2d 271,273 (Utah App. 1988); accord Commercial Security? Bank
v. Hodson, 15 Utah 2d 388. 393 P.2d 482 (1964)..
The only other possible standard would be a mixed one of reviewing the "measure
of discretion" given to the trial court. This standard is set forth in State v. Pena, 869
P.2d at 936-39. When a legal rule is to be applied to a given set of facts, or in other
words when the trial court must determine "whether a given set of facts comes within the
reach of a given rule of law," the trial court is given a de facto grant of discretion. Id. At
936-37. Although legal questions are reviewed for correctness, appellate courts may still
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grant a trial court discretion in its application of the law to a given fact situation. See
Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d at 1244. Because of the fact sensitive nature of the good faith
requirement, this alternate standard does not apply.
ISSUE 1(c).

Weinstein then urges that the district court rewrote a contract

between the parties to contain a term that "permission cannot be unreasonably withheld."
This issue appears to suggest that such determination is an abuse of discretion.
STANDARD:

The standard of review is the abuse of discretion standard,

which requires the appellate court to find that there is "no reasonable basis for the
decision." See Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exck. 860 P.2d 937. 938 (Utah 1993). A trial
judge's determination will be reversed if the ruling "is so unreasonable that it can be
classified as arbitrary and capricious or a clear abuse of discretion." Kunzler v. O 'Dell
855 P.2d 270. 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Ames v. Maas. 846 P.2d 468. 476 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993).
ISSUE 11(a).

Weinstein next suggests that the district court failed to grant a

mandatory injunction. This determination is clearly within the discretionary power of the
trial court.
STANDARD:

The standard of review is the abuse of discretion standard set

forth above. This standard has specifically been applied to whether a trial court properly
granted or denied injunctive relief. See Aquagenlnt'l

Inc. v. Calrae Trust, 972 P.2d

411, 412 (Utah 1998); Miller v. Martineau & Co.. 372 Utah Adv. Rep. 34. 36 (Utah Ct.
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App. 1999V
ISSUE 11(b).

Weinstein then complains that the trial court denied relief for a

"lack of perceived damages." This determination is one of discretion with the trial court.
STANDARD:

The standard of review is the abuse of discretion standard set

forth above and specifically applied to a denial of injunctive relief.
ISSUE III.

Weinstein next complains that the trial court did not give him an

opportunity to introduce evidence of actual damages. There is no reference whatsoever
in the record to his ever attempting to do so, nor does he suggest that he attempted to
introduce such evidence. This is not an issue for appeal.
ISSUE IV.

Weinstein finally urges that the Appellate Court review the trial

court's failure to direct reimbursement of his legal fees and expenses. His argument, at
Point III indicates that he finds it to be an abuse of discretion.
STANDARD:

The standard of review is the abuse of discretion standard set

forth above. With regard to this standard, the appellant must show the trial court
exceeded the measure of discretion allotted by showing no reasonable basis for the
decision.

10

PRESERVATION OF ISSUES
At no stage of the proceedings did Weinstein's trial counsel preserve any of the
issues raised on appeal for the first time for appellate review. There were no objections
to actions taken by the trial court. There were no requests to introduce evidence of
damages. No post trial motions were filed. Appellant raises all issues for Ihe first time
on appeal. The rationale for preservation is that the trial court, in fairness, ought to have
a chance to correct its own errors. See State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 122L 1225-26, 1227
(Utah 1998); In re Estate of Morrison, 933 P.2d 1015. 1018 (Utah Ct. App.1997)

STATEMENT OF GROUNDS
Appellant Weinstein fails to set forth any grounds for the appeal. The only point
he consistently returns to in his brief is that the CC&Rs require that he give his
permission before the Popiels can build a fence on their property. He has repeatedly
refused to give his permission. He states that it is his legal and absolute right to withhold
it, even to the point of arbitrary refusal. The trial court respectfully disagrees.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Popiels stand firmly on the facts of the case set forth by the district court in its
ruling. Because Weinstein has failed to marshal the evidence, the appellate court must
accept the facts as set forth by the trial court. Neighbor Weinstein argues with the findings
of fact throughout his brief and attempts to repeatedly return to the record to selectively
introduce facts favorable to him, not advising the appellate court that many of his selections
were controverted, i.e. urging that another neighbor objected to the fence and that the
property owners built their fence maliciously and with actual knowledge of a requirement
to obtain his permission, which points of view the trial court specifically controverts. The
appellate court should disregard pages 8-15 of appellant's brief for this reason and apply the
trial court's findings of fact, which are as follow.

"The parties live in the Ranch Place subdivision. Their properties adjoin each other,
in part. All properties and homeowners in Ranch Place are subject to Covenants, Conditions
and Restrictions ("CC&Rs") which were in place when both parties bought their respective
properties, and at all times relevant to the dispute. Fencing of Ranch Place properties is
subject to specific conditions in the CC&Rs. Until 2000, neither property was fenced.
Many properties in Ranch Place are fenced and many of the existing fences exceed the four
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foot height restriction. Few fences in the parties' immediate neighborhood are fenced, and
before the Popiels fenced their property, approximately seven adjacent properties were
unfenced and constituted de facto common ground between and around the houses. The
Popiels' fence complies with neighborhood standards, was approved by the Homeowners'
Association ("HOA"), but it exceeds the height restriction by approximately three to nine
inches. The height is, however, consistent with the height of other fences in the subdivision.
The Popiels fenced their property for at least two reasons: to restrain and protect their
surviving dog, after one dog was killed by an automobile, and to prevent Mr. Weinstein
from using their property to run his dog. Popiels did not obtain Mr. Weinstein's permission
before they erected a fence that ran just inside their property line, where it adjoins Mr.
Weinstein's property. The CC&Rs require that such permission be obtained. Mr. Weinstein
withheld his permission for at least two reasons: first, he relied on the use of Popiels'
property to extend his relatively small backyard to provide exercise and play for his dog, and
he also cherished the "common" ground which he believes benefitted not just him, but all
adjoining property owners. Mr. Weinstein claims he would never have bought his property
if he had believed his neighbors could erect an adjoining fence over his objections. Two
other property adjoining property owners have given permission for the fence. There is a
dispute whether Martins gave permission, but they have since sold their property, and they
have never filed a formal complaint or joined this lawsuit. The Popiels did receive preapproval for the fence from the HOA, but the approval letter failed to refer to the need to
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obtain permission from neighbors, and Mr. Weinstein had no notice of the construction until
after it was accomplished.
When Mr. Weinstein pursued his objection with the HOA, after construction was
complete, the HOA agreed that the approval letter lacked reference to the need for
permission, but the officers of the HOA indicated that they believed the approval
requirement was a courtesy provision, and not an absolute requirement. Because Mr.
Weinstein persevered with his objections, the HOA then conducted a variance procedure to
determine if the Association members were willing to grant a variance for the lack of
permission. At the time of the meeting, Mr. Weinstein had never objected to the excessive
height of the fence, and the height was not at issue. At the HOA meeting, homeowners in
attendance voted 64 to zero in favor of the variance. That is not the required absolute
majority of all homeowners, but unrebutted evidence establishes that when proxies were
counted, the vote exceeded fifty percent. Neither party presented evidence that proxies are
not valid with respect to a variance vote."
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Weinstein states in his summary of his argument that the district court interjected an
implied condition of fair dealings and good faith and accepted a disputed subjective excuse
and argues that such actions were improper. Mr. Weinstein's arguments are incorrect and
lack legal foundation.

He cannot have it both ways. On the one hand he would like to argue that the
CC&Rs constitute an absolute, unambiguous contract between the parties, which the court
must enforce with strict rigidity. On the other hand, if one accepts that the court must
consider the CC&Rs to be a contract, then one cannot disregard the well established
application of the mandatory implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which adheres
to all contracts in the State of Utah. The trial court did not "interject" anything improperly
and is not rewriting the terms of the contract, as neighbor Weinstein repeatedly complains.

The property owners stand firmly behind the long line of precedent in this
jurisdiction, which abhors discretionary capriciousness and looks to the common good and
purpose, course of dealings and conduct of the parties and reasonable expectations.
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These principles control and guide our courts and are set forth with their
corresponding authority in the property owners' Argument. Neighbor Weinstein ignores
Utah's adherence to consideration of the common good and would have the court apply the
contextual extracts of law from the multiple cases he cites from foreign jurisdictions, such
as New York, New Jersey, Texas, Colorado, Oklahoma and other states. Weinstein relies
further on employing unsavory language in his challenge to the trial court's ruling; accusing
the court of "arriving at the popular position," depicting him as a villain, focusing on the
"abortive variance vote" of the Home Owners Association and overlooking the "false
publicity" mis-characterizing him..

ARGUMENT
Where expressly stated, restrictive covenants are not favored in the law and are
strictly construed in favor of the free and unrestricted use of property. Robbins v. Finaly,
645 P.2d 623.627 (Utah 19&2): Parrishv. Richards, 8 Utah 2d 419.421.336 P.2d 122.123
(1959): Freeman v. Gee, 18 Utah 2d 339. 345. 423 P.2d 155. 159 (1967). Generally,
express restrictive covenants are upheld only "where they are necessary for the protection
of the business for the benefit of which the covenant was made and no greater restraint is
imposed than is reasonably necessary to secure such protection. Allen v. Rose Park
Pharmacy, 120 Utah 608. 614. 237 P.2d 823. 826 (1951).
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Neighbor Weinstein uses language in his brief which suggests that he, himself,
bargained with property owners Popiel to create the provisions of the CC&Rs. He suggests
that he is being deprived of the benefit of the bargain, if he cannot now exercise his absolute
unequivocal contract right to withhold his permission for the property owners to have their
rather innocuous split rail fence in their back yard. [The fence is of the type which has three
split log rails, each approximately 9? long; held up by vertical posts at each end.]
The trial court in the instant case did not abuse its discretion in finding that Weinstein
unreasonably withheld his permission for the Popiels to build their fence. The Utah
Supreme Court set forth controlling principles in Peirce v. Peirce, 2000 UT 7 (Utah 2000)
when it stated that "we interpret the terms of a contract in light of the reasonable
expectations of the parties, looking to the agreement as a whole and to the circumstances,
nature and purpose of the contract." See Utah State Med. Ass 'n v. Utah State Employees
Credit Union, 655 P.2d 643, 646 (Utah 1982); Mxow v. Nixon, Inc. v. John New &Assocs.,
Inc.. 641 P. 2d 144, 146 (Utah 1982); adding that "where there is doubt about the
interpretation of a contract, a fair and equitable result will be preferred over a harsh and
unreasonable one. And an interpretation that will produce an inequitable result will be
adopted only where the contract so expressly and unequivocally so provides that there is no
other reasonable interpretation to be given it."
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BREACH OF IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH
AND FAIR DEALING

It is well established and longstanding law in the State of Utah that every contract
is subject to an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
"A covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in most, if not all,
contractual relationships." St. Benedict's Dev. V. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811
P.2d 194, 199-200 (Utah 1991).
The trial court did not interject an implied condition. "Every contract is subject to an
implied covenant of good faith." ladanza v. Mather, 820 F. Supp. 1371 (10th Cir. 1993).
Weinstein did not obtain a transcript of the Summary Judgment hearing for the record on
appeal, as requested by Appellee's motion, because it was in that hearing the argument was
advanced with regard to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. It was not interjected
after the hearing and it cannot be so argued in the absence of any record.. Nor can there be
any argument that there was no basis in fact for the trial court's ruling, reviewing the court's
own findings of fact, which stand as written.
It is well established that an element of reasonableness must attach to the language
of the CC&Rs.
"The purpose, intentions, and expectations of the parties should be determined
by considering the contract language and the course of dealings and conduct
of the parties." Ibid St. Benedicts 811 P.2d. 194. 199-200 (Utah 1991).
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The CC&Rs provide that actions such as building a fence are to be evaluated,
approved and overseen by the Homeowners Association ("HOA"). The property owners
complied with this provision. The trial court found in its findings that "the officers of the
HO A indicated that they believed the approval requirement was a courtesy provision and
not an absolute requirement. "

The HOA was convinced that the neighbor had no

legitimate reason for withholding his approval, such as fence color or type and that the only
reason for refusing to give permission was that he could no longer run his dog across their
property (R-0231, 0246). The HOA believed that the purpose of an objection was to call
to the committee's attention a legitimate problem to be considered by them in granting an
approval. Weinstein's refusal to grant permission did not further the common good or
purpose of the restrictive covenants.

The parties to a contract are deemed to intend that the terms of a contract should be
construed in a manner which assumes the parties intended that the duties and rights created
by the contract should be performed and exercised in good faith. This means that "one party
may not render it difficult or impossible for the other to continue performance and then take
advantage of the non-performance he has caused. Zion's Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d
1319, 1321 (Utah 1975V See also Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Smith's Food and
Drug Ctrs, Inc., 889 P.2d 445. 450 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
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There is no case law known to the Appellees which grants one party an absolute and
unreasonable right to exercise a discretionary withholding of approval over the other.

"To comply with his obligation to perform a contract in good faith, a party's
actions must be consistent with the agreed common purpose and the justified
expectations of the other party." St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's
Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 199-200 (Utah 1991)

"When a party has been granted discretion under a contract, that discretion may not
be exercised capriciously or in bad faith." Ibid., Olympus Hills, 889 P.2d 445, 456 (Utah
App. 1994). The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals has observed that "the purpose of the good
faith doctrine in contract law is to protect the reasonable expectations of the parties by
'implying terms in the agreement.'" Big Horn Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 852
F.2d 1259, 1267 (10th Cir. 1988). Where an express term establishes a right or power to be
exercised in the sole discretion of one party, in Utah that right or power must be exercised
consistent with the covenant of good faith. A.I. Transp. v. Imperial Premium Fin., 862 F.
Supp. 345 00 t h Cir. 1988).

Neighbor Weinstein has adamantly announced even after-the-fact that "he wouldn't
have approved [the fence] if asked" (R-0224) and that he "won't give permission because
they never asked me" (R-0230). The Association believed that he would not give his
permission was because he used to run his dog on their property (R-0231).
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"An examination of express contract terms alone is insufficient to determine
whether there has been a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. To comply with his obligation to perform a contract in good faith, a
party's actions must be consistent with the agreed common purpose and
the justified expectations of the other party. The purpose, intentions, and
expectations of the parties should be determined by considering the contract
language and the course of dealings between and conduct of the parties."
Ibid., St Benedicts. 811 P.2d 194, 200 (Utah 1991) (emphasis added).

Thus it is the parties' agreed common purpose and justified expectations that are
critical in determining whether the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has been
breached. A party's expectations can be justified only when grounded in the language of
the contract, the course of dealing between the parties, and/or the parties' conduct. In the
instant case particularly, one must consider the role of the Homeowners Association,
Architectural Committee and the Officers, who are called upon to determine the common
purpose and good of the Association and its members.

"...courts endeavor to construe contracts so as not to grant one of the parties
an absolute and arbitrary right...." Resource Management Co. v. Weston
Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028. 1037 (Utah 1985) See also Beck v.
Farmer's Ins. Exck. 701 P.2d 795. 797-98 (Utah 1985V
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The neighbor makes the argument to the appellate court that this matter is similar to
zoning violations and their interference with property rights. At the same time, and with a
straight face, he is suggesting that he must be allowed to exercise his absolute discretionary
right to withhold his permission in order "to protect the residential integrity of the
neighborhood." The comparison is rather empty.

ATTORNEYS FEES
Weinstein requested only that the trial court order that the fence be torn down and did
not during litigation or subsequently suggest or introduce any evidence suggesting that he
suffered damages (R-0121). The trial court awarded him only nominal damages of $1.00.
The trial court did not award attorneys fees or costs to either party. This determination is
entirely within the discretion of the trial court and is solidly supported by law.
The trial court necessarily has broad discretion in determining the amount of a
reasonable attorney fee and will not be reversed unless the court abuses its discretion. Dixie
State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985. 991 (Utah 1988). In the absence of abuse of
discretion, the amount of the award by the district court will not be disturbed. 20 Am.Jur.
2d Costs, section 78 (1965).
Where nominal damages are allowed, one dollar is the amount generally awarded.
Snyderville Transportation Co. v. Christiansen, 609 P.2d 939 (Utah 1980).
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When both parties could be described as successful and unsuccessful, the net result
of the litigation leaves no clear successful party to award fees to and no clear unsuccessful
party to assess them against. It is proper, therefore, that each party bear its own attorneys
fees and costs. See Fashion Place Assocs. v. Glad Rags, 754 P.2d 940 (Utah 1988).
This position is well founded at law. The 10th circuit has adopted the test set forth
in Nadeau v. Helgernoe* 581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir 1978) for determining whether a plaintiff is
prevailing. To meet that test, a plaintiff must show two things: (1) that the lawsuit is
causally linked to securing the relief obtained, and (2) that the defendant's conduct in
response to the lawsuit was required by law. See e.g. J&J Anderson, Inc. v. Town of Erie,
767 F.2d 1469. 1475 (10th Cir 1985). The U.S. District Court stated in David C v. LeavitU
900 F. Supp. 1547 (10th Cir. 1995) that this test can be characterized thusly: A party may be
deemed to have prevailed sufficiently to warrant the award of attorneys' fees under a two
part "catalyst test." Under this test a plaintiff must have been a "significant catalyst" causing
a defendant to change position, and the defendant's change in position must have been
required under law. This test was not satisfied in the instant case.
The United States Supreme Court set forth the most definitive standard in Farrar v.
Hobby. 506 U.S. 103. 121 L. Ed. 2d 494, 113 S. Ct. 566. 572 (1992) justifying the trial
court's denial of attorneys fees, by holding that where a plaintiff recovers only nominal
damages, the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all. The degree of a prevailing party's
"overall success" determines the reasonableness of an award.
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The trial court has followed the law in requiring each party to bear its own attorneys
fees and costs.
FRIVOLOUS APPEAL
This appeal is frivolous and without merit. It has been undertaken without reasonable
basis of prevailing. If Appellant had researched the law set forth by the Appellee in this
brief before filing the appeal, it would have been apparent to him that there was no basis.
The Popiels have been continuously forced to defend themselves from malicious prosecution
in this matter against a vindictive and malevolent neighbor. They built a fence around their
yard with the written authorization of their Homeowners Association after submitting a
written request for approval. The neighbor refused to accept the Association's actions and
made life unbearable for everyone by constant complaining and threatening. The property
owners then cooperated with legal counsel for the Association when complaining did not
let up by obtaining signatures from all their neighbors and going through a formal variance
procedure to obtain the unanimous approval of all homeowners in a formal vote to authorize
the fence to remain. Appellant Weinstein refused to accept the will, not only of the board
and the officers of the Association, but of all of the homeowners. The property owners were
forced to defend themselves in court when the neighbor sued them to have the fence torn
down. They prevailed and the trial court allowed the fence to remain. Appellant has again
refused to accept even the District Court's ruling and has filed this appeal.
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The appeal is frivolous and intended to do nothing more than harass the property
owners. The Appellees seek and are entitled to their attorneys fees and costs incurred to
defend against this appeal pursuant to Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

CONCLUSION
Appellant Weinstein has failed to show that "there is no reasonable basis" for the trial
court's ruling. The "abuse of discretion" standard requires such a showing. The appeal
centers upon the application of the covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, which
Weinstein does not believe should be applied to his situation. If, however, he had
researched the applicable case law, it would have been readily apparent that there are no
grounds for the appeal.
WHEREFORE Appellees Popeil, ask this Honorable Court to deny all relief
requested by Appellant, find that this is a frivolous appeal, and award thern attorneys fees
and costs for having to defend this action. Appellees further request Oral Argument if the
Court deems such to be appropriate.
ADDENDUM
No addendum is necessary and none is attached. All references to the trial court's
Ruling are to the Ruling and Order attached to Appellant Weinstein's brief.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2&

day of February, 2003.

LAW QEFICE OF THOMAS HOWARD

Thomas L. Howard
Attorney for Appellees

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2&

day of February, 2003 I served two true,

correct and exact copies of the foregoing APPELLEES' BRIEF upon the Appellant by
placing same in the U.S. Mail, first-class mail, postage pre-paid, addressed as follows:
George Weinstein
Appellant Pro Se
1821 Browning Court
Park City, Utah 84098

Thomas L. Howard
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